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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 06/03/2011 Accident number: 665 
Accident time: 08:54 Accident Date: 17th August 2008 
Where it occurred: MF 081, Dragi village, 
Tani district, Khost 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field Control 
Inadequacy 
Secondary cause: Management Control 
Inadequacy 
Class: Excavation Accident Date of main report: 17th October 2010 
ID original source: Ref # 214 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast Ground condition: mountainous 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 06/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
Inadequate investigation (?) 
Squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
Visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
Inadequate equipment (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing (?) 
Inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned Summary supplied as a PDF file.  Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some 
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formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as 
more information becomes available. 
The accident summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (UNMACCA) 
Ref # 214: File: OPS/14/17 /October /2010 
Subject: Investigation Report & Lessons Learned of [Demining group] CBDT-23 Demining 
Accident. 
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of demining accident 
happened on 17 August 2010 at 08:54 hrs, in Dragi village Tani district of Khost province. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBDT-23 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
Demining investigation teams were convened by AMAC Gardez and [Demining group] to 
investigate and find out the cause of the demining accident involving [TheVictim] the deminer 
of [Demining group] CBDT-23. The accident occurred at 8:54 hours, on 17 August 2010 in 
Task # AF/3203/00398/MF 081 located in Dragi village, Tani district of Khost province. 
SUMMARY: 
Task # AF/3203/00398/MF 081 is located in a mountainous area contaminated with anti- 
personnel mines, in Dec 2009 the area polygon surveyed by [Demining group] LIAT–1 1. 
Mines planted by Russian forces during the year 1984 to protect their position from the 
possible attacks of Mujahiddin. 
Mine clearance operations in Tani district started by [Demining group] as community based 
demining approach and deminers from the community are engaged in this operation. On 8th 
July 2010, CBDT-23 started demining operations in mentioned minefield, the progress was 
around 20% till the demining accident happened. The team found/destroyed 4 anti-personal 
mines up to the accident time. 
On 17 August 2010 [the Victim] the deminer was working in his clearance lane excavating a 
detected signal, his excavation tool touched a mine and caused it to explode. According to the 
investigation report the signal was not pinpointed correctly and the deminer has used his 
bayonet directly on the top of anti-personnel mine, so the accident happened. Unfortunately 
the victim deminer was not fully dressed with PPE, so he got severe injuries on his eyes, 
whole face and finger of his left hand. 
As the majority of minefields in Tani district are located on the hillsides, and the likelihood of 
mines with changed position due to seasonal flood is high. Therefore, a comprehensive site 
operations plan was required covering all the predictable scenarios during the clearance 
operations e.g. changes in direction of mines, mine displacement etc. But this point was 
missed in the site operations plan. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The main contributing factor to this accident was the carelessness of deminer himself. In 
addition, as the deminer was working without having worn his PPE appropriately and had not 




The following points are to be considered: 
A. [Demining group] operation department is recommended to take necessary action in terms 
of strengthening command and control element in their teams especially in community based 
projects. 
B. A strong discipline should be emplaced in all community based projects as this is the third 
accident within Tani CBD project of the same scenario. 
C. As Tani is a tribal area and all the people are strongly following their elders, therefore, the 
issue of carelessness of deminers should be discussed with elders and the possible 
consequences of the situation should be detailed to them. 
D. [Demining group] operations department is recommended to develop a plan for the 
improvement of supervision, command and control in their teams. 
E. Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required 




Victim number:  Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: Deminer  Fit for work: Not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron, Visor Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: Severe eyes, Severe face, Severe hand 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the Victim was working without pin-pointing his metal-detector reading 
and without wearing his visor but his errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is listed 
as a Management Control Inadequacy because the “community” deminer appears to have 
been inadequately prepared for his role and not overseen by suitably competent field 
supervisors. 
The Inadequate training under Notes refers to the Victim’s inability to use his detector 
appropriately, dangerous excavation technique and failure to wear PPE correctly. The 
Inadequate equipment under Notes refers to the issue of a short handtool that does not meet 
the IMAS recommendation for blast-resistant tools. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
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in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of the accident summary 
implies that the Afghan investigators did make a comprehensive report and the failure of the 
UN to share it with others is regrettable.   
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